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ABSTRACT 
On 13 January 1972, Lockheed Propulsion Company was requested by NASA to perform a study of the applicability 
of solid rocket motors a s  the booster for the Space Shuttle Vehicle. This volume of the final report presents a 
review of the activities of the study effort, the major findings and conclusicns. as  well a s  significant substanti- 
ating data. 
Lockheed Propulsion Company's approach to the study was to use (1) a design approach representative of Phase 
B system contractor design input and based on conservative design practiie. and (2) conservative costs based on 
large solid rocket motor experience and firm subcontractor quotes. The 156-inch-diameter, parallel-bcrn solid 
rocket motor was selected a s  the baseline design 
success. 
Shuttle Booster because: 
Five motors of this size have been tested by LPC with complete 
Lockheed Propulsion Company believes this design to be the best solid rocket motor for the Space 
0 
0 
e 
It provides low booster vehicle cost 
It is the largest proven transportable system 
It is a demonatrated design 
The key issues related to  the SRM booster - -  recovery/reuse, abort, and ecological considerations - -  were 
evaluated, with the following conclusions: 
0 
0 
0 
Recorery/reuse is  feasible, znd would significantly reduce costs from the Daseline costs. 
Abort can be accomplished successfully. 
Ecological effects a r e  minor, and therefore considered to be acceptable. 
The current (Revision 1) baseline total program cost is  3.14 billion dollars and the total cost per launch is 
7.1 inillion dollars. (recurring cost per launch is 6.6 million ) 
LOCKHEED PROPULSION COMPAbW 
P.0.BOX 1 I I REDLANDS, CALIFORNIA 92373 
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FORE WORD 
This document is Volume I, Executive Summary, of Lockheed Propulsion 
Company's final report  €or the Study of Solid R x k e t  Motors for a Space 
Shxttle Booster. The study was conducted for the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration under Contract Numter  NAS8-28429. 
is submitted in response to Daca ReTairement MA-05. 
This final report  is organized as follows: 
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SUMMARY 
Lockheed Propulsion Company's objective from the outset of the Space 
Shuttle Program has been to provide complete and conservative design and 
cost parameters  for an expendable Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Booster Vehicle 
for the Space Shuttle Program. With this approach, LPG has attempted to 
identify the maximum technical and cost r i sks  that could be encountered by 
NASA in employing a solid rocket motor as the Space Shuttle Booster Vehicle. 
Therefore,  LPC believes that the baseline vehicle costs presented in this 
report  are distinctly conservative and will be reduced upon further definition 
and detailed estimating. Two items, which LPC has not included and which 
will affect a fixed-payload program cost, are escalation and profit, both of 
which were directed in the Study Contract to be deleted from consideration. 
As directed by NASA, LPC also attempted to determine "hard" versus "soft" 
costs, and an upper band was established above the baseline for a "worst 
condition." As a resul t  of Lockheed's solid rocket motor experience, the 
propulsion system costs are "hard" and, therefore,  an upper limit of 2 p e r -  
cent on the SRM cost has been defined. LPC believes that the Stage costs 
a r e  "soft" and a 30-percent upper limit on the Stage cost was established, 
With the SRM and Stage combined, a total of 10-percent upward variation 
has been identified in the Booster Vehicle (WBS 3.3) Program costs. 
lower range has a lso been established, which identifies potential reductions 
for thrust  vector control, thrust  termination, and recovery. 
A 
The Booster Vehicle selected as the baseline Configuration is a parallel-  
burn (two -motor) 156 -inch-diameter SRM vehicle sized for the large 
(65,000-pound) Orbiter payload. 
purposes includes a 5 -year (1973 - 1978)'development/qualification program, 
a 13-year (1976 - 1988) production program, and an 11-year (1978 - 1988)i 
440 vehicle launch program. 
The baseline program assumed for study 
The development program includes 25 SRMs; 5 development motor tests, 
4 PFRT motor tests,  2 inert  booster vehicles (2 SRMs per  vehicle) and 6 
launches (1 unmanned and 5 manned flights with 2 SRMs per vehicle). All 
25 motors in.the development program will be fabricated in LPC's existing, 
large -motor Pot re ro  manufacturing facility. 
schedule was established at 5 years  to minimize annual funding and could 
be shorzened by a s  much as 1 year without impacting the launch schedule. 
The development progrdm 
The production program of 440 launches includes manufacture of 883 SRMs 
(880 for launches and 3 for production facility s ta r t -up  demonstration) and 
440 se t s  of Stage hardware. 
quality is ensured by the facility process  controls in  manufacturing. Thus 
a three-motor tes t  program is planned to demonstrate that the production 
facilities will reproducibly deliver the SRMs qualified during development. 
As directed in  the Study Contract, a l l  launches were considered to be from . 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC). 
Due to the nature of the solid rocket motor ,  
- V -  
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Lockheed Propulsion Company, as pr ime contractor for the Booster Vehicle, 
would utilize all of the industry production capability before additional facility 
expansion. 
for a portion of the production motors. 
be considered for dual procurement to ensure a redundant capability for 
Booster Vehicle delivery. This LPC plan provides Booster Vehicle procure - 
ment a t  a very low r i sk  to NASA in . -  e event of a labor, facility, or  mater ia l  
problem at any time during the program, 
relatively low facility expansion cost ($25.7 million) for the production pro - 
gram and avoids the building of a brand new facility, which would cost 
approximately $70 million. 
LPC would subcontract to a t  least  two other SRM manufacturers 
Additionally, all components would 
This approach a l so  resul ts  in  a 
The three production facility s tar t -up demonstration tes ts  are conaidered 
adequate by LPC to. qualify the three  production facilities (LPC and two others)  
for the baseline costing effort. It was considered that NASA might des i re  
additional testing to qualify the new subcontractors ("second sources  ' I )  and, 
therefore, nine motor tes ts  were included in establishing the upper limit 2 -  
percent variation in SRM costing. However, LPC recommends only three 
tests and haa used this in the baseline costing. 
Previously, it has been stated that the baseline design is conservative. As 
evidence of this, all metal s t ructures  have a minimum safety factor of 1.4. 
This has naturally imposed an additional cost on materials, but LPC believes 
that this should be maintained, thus guaranteehg the high reliability required 
for a man-rated system. As a bonus feature, analysis indicates that the 
motor chamber with this safety factor (wall thickness 0.460 inch) will with- 
stand water impact loads at 100 feet per  second and a t  entrance angles up to 
45 degrees. Although recovery/reuse is not considered in the baseline 
costing, Lockheed's SRM design should therefore not require  additional 
strengthening (higher material costs) should recovery/reuse prove cost-  
effective for the Booster Vehicle. 
As further evidence of a conservative design, the safety factor for all ahla- 
tive insulation materials was established at 2.0. Once again, it is feit that 
this should be maintained for man-rated re1iabili:y. In the areas of thrust  
termination (TT) and thrust  vector control (TVC), no firm requirement was 
established by either the Phase B contractors o r  by the customer. 
assumed that the Booster Vehicle would require  both T T  and TVC, plus a 
strenuous TVC duty cycle, which sized the system conservatively. 
The baseline costs are backed by firm vendor quotes on procured compo- 
nents and conservative labor estimates.  Lockheed's labor estimates were 
prepared from a task definition o r  "ground-up" standpoint, based on p re -  
vious LPC large -motor experience, other LPC rocket mcjtor programs,  
and also on related industry experience on solid propellant rocket motors.  
Kine full-scale, 156-inch-diameter dernonstration motors have been tes t -  
f ired to date, five by Lackheed Propul.sion Company. 
marized in  the following table, 
( 
LPC 
These tes ts  a r e  s u m -  
-vi- 
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SUMMARY O F  156-INCH LARGE SOLID ROCKET MOTOR TESTS 
I .  
2, 
3. 
4, 
5. 
6, 
7, 
8. 
9. 
.Date 
1964 May 
1965 Feb 
De c 
De c 
1946 Jan 
SeP 
APr 
May 
May 
Test  Data. 
Maximum Average Motor Description 
Designation 
156-3 
156 -4 
156-2C- I. 
156 - 1 
156 -5 
156-6 
L-73 
156-7 
156 -9 
Fabrication 
LPC 
LPC 
TCC 
TCC 
-- 
Thrust (lb) 
0.95M 
5.09M 
3.25M 
1.4TiM 
3.11M 
1,03M 
0,661Ur 
0.39M 
C.98M 
Thrust --
0.88M 
1. OOM 
2.97M. 
1. X9M 
2.84M 
0.94M 
0.6 OM 
0.3 2M 
G. 8 8,M 
All of these motors,  with thrust  levels up to  three million pounds, performed 
within 2 percent of their calculated parameters ,  and only one incident; (involving 
the loss of an exit cone in a moveable nozzle test by another contractorj was 
experienced. 
a "one -of -a-kind" configuration and involved reuse of LPC-designed case 
hardware as many as four times. Lockheed is proud of this 100-percent 
successful completion of its five 156-inch motor tes ts ,  which weie  accom- 
plished under-budget on firm fixed price contracts (see USAF Testimonials 
in Appendix A of the Cost Book). 
As previously stated, the experience gained in these programs was applied 
by all LPC branches in estimating the labor for the Booster Vehicle. 
a r e a  of motor processing, the hands -on-hardware "first-unit" labor hours 
for the baseline were 'estimated, and then a 90-percent labor improvemeht 
or learning curve was applied. Comparison with both LPC experience and 
other SRM industry experience indicates that this is conservative; i n  the 
majority of previous programs, improvement curves in the rnicldle to  low 
eighties have been experienced. F o r  example, on the basis of two large 
weapon systems, Minuteman and Poseidon, a n  improvement curve in the 80-  
to  85-percent range should be achievable in  the Booster Vehicle. F o r  this 
additional reason, LPC, employing a 90-percent curve, has estimated the 
baseline configuration production costs in a conservative manner. 
This is a significant feat in that each of the nine motors was 
In the 
As another consideration in development of the costs, LPC began this study 
on 13 January 1972 assuming that the Booster System (WBS 3.0) was to be 
costed. On 2 February,  LPC was notified that the SRM contractors were to 
price at the Booster Vehicle level (WBS 3.3). While this was intended by 
NASA to alleviate the SRM contractors'  efforts i n  the short  study t ime avail- 
able, it did tu rn  out to add another variable, which is reflected as additional 
conservatism in  the LPC costs. 
that could be interpreted as belonging under Booster Management (WBS 3. l ) ,  
System Engineering (WBS 3.2),  or Booster System Support (WBS 3.5), which 
may not be included in the cost estimates of the other study contractors. 
Included in LPC's costs a r e  some items 
-vii- 
629-6 
Vol 1 
The Booster Vehicle program costs (WBS 3.3) presented by LPC on 14 and 
23 February 1972 were baBed on the previously defined configuration and 
costing assumptions. 
presented on these dates is summarized below. 
The LPC baseline Eooster Vehicle cost: estimate 
TotEd 
----?".- SRM Stage Booster Vehicle 
Development $ 141.6M !€ 48,2M 
Production 2,545 .?M 929. OM 
$977.2M --$2,687.3M 
$ 189.8M 
3,474.7M 
$3,664.5M 
Total Frogram 
COS t/Launch $ Q.OM $ 2.2M $ 8.ZM 
R e cur r in g 
Cos t/Eaunch $ 5.8M $ 2.OM !$ 7 . m  
The total program cost per launch i n  developed by dividing the total program 
cost (3,664.5 million) hy the total number of manned launches (445). 
cost per  launch does not normally include amortization of DDT&E or noa- 
recurr ing production i tems, L P C  chose to attempt to dispSay the total  p ro -  
gram liability that NASA could encounter in erriploying a eolid rocket motor 
Booster Vehicle. 
the recurr ing unit cost, which, for LPG's baseline, is $7.8M. tlnce again, 
these program costs were developed ear ly  in the Study Program with the 
objective of identifying the rnaxihuan technical and cost r i sk  that could he 
encountered by NASA. 
Although 
The standard way of displaying cost  per launch ic by using 
On 12 February,  after the cut-off date for the 14 and 23 February  presenta-  
tions, Lockheed began a second iterstion of the program baseline configura- 
tion and cost. 
definition was prepared to separate  recurr ing from nonrecurring costs,  and 
the Operations portions of the SRM and Stage were separated into m o r e  idsn-  
tifiable activities. This resulted in a redistribution of the baseline costs as 
shown in the following two tables: 
Labor and material were analyzed ia more depth, more  
SitM Gtage Operations Total 
Development $ 131.OM $ 31.0M $ 27.8M $ 189.8M 
Production 2,803.9M 626.5M 544.3M 3,474.7M 
$2,434.9M $65?.5.M $572, h i  $3,664.5M 
Note that in both tzbles the previously shown total  program costs have 
remained unchanged but are redistributed by LPC for better understanding, 
-viii- 
Recurring Total 
Total Costs Cost/Eaunc& Cost/launch 
Recarring 6RM 
Recurring Stage 
production $2,242.8M $5.1M 
production 626.5M l .4M 
Re cur r irag 
operations 
Norme curring 
production 
544,3M 1,2M 
$5.1M 
1.4M 
1.2M 
61.1M 0 0.1M 
Development 189.8M 
Total $3,664.§M 
0 
$7,7M(") 
0.4M 
$8.2M 
The next step in the second iteration of the baseline configuration and cost 
was to review areas where cost might be overly conservative and could thus 
be reduced. Since the hardware is a major  portion of the SRM cost, addi- 
tional definition and breakdown of vendor component and mater ia l  costs were 
requested from the subcontract suppliers, In  vehicle configuration, better 
design definition was developed and rebids were prepared in  some areas .  
As an example, in January, pr ior  to completion of the TVC system sizing, 
quotas had to be obtained on the actuator. 
used on the S1-C Vehicle, knowing that it would be more  than adequate for the 
job. 
significantly lower cost. 
and the material  costs still ref lect  safety factors of 1.4 on s t ructures  and 
2,O on ablative insulations. 
LPC requested bids on the actuator 
The actuator requirement was found to be far less and was rebid at a 
Safety factors of all hardware were  maintained 
The motor processing tasks and the improvement/learning curve were 
reviewed in considerable depth. A steeper curve (86 percent) was selected 
as real is t ic  but still sufficiently conservative in comparison to other major 
solid rocket motcr programs and LPC's 156-inch motor experience. 
Assembly and support labor were also analyzed and some a r e a s  of reduni- 
dancy between WBS paragraphs were identified and deleted. The analysis 
of labor and material on the SRM has resulted in a lower unit cost position 
for  the SRM baseline. 
although some areas of the Stage attachment hardware and Operations have 
been reviewed and reduced, additional effor t  is being expended by Lockheed 
toward further definition, analysis, and reduction. 
These analyses have been time-consuming and, 
To support a final report  date of 15 March, a cut-off was made on 8 March 
in the second costing iteration, The reduced program costs a r e  shown in 
the following table as "Baseline, Revision 1" and a r e  compared by item to 
the original baseline costs shown previously. 
(a) As a minor note, the redistribution identified additional nonrecurring 
production costs, resulting in a lower recurring cost per launch. 
" ix- 
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Baseline Baseline 
Cost Reduction Revis i0n-L 
Recurring SRM Production $2,242.8M $266.8M $1,476.OM 
Recurring Stage Production 626.5M 155.7M 470.8M 
Recurring Operations 544.3M 98. OM 446,3M 
Nonre cur r ing Production 6 1.1M 0 6 1.1M 
Development 189.8M 3.7M 186.1M 
$3,664.5M $524.2M $3,140.3M 
Total Cos t/Launch $ 8.2M $ 1.lM $ 7.1M 
Re cur ring Cos t/Laun ch $ 7.7M $ 1.lM $ 6.6M 
Each of the reductions shown in this table is discussed in the Addendum to 
the cost book of the f ina l  report. The cost per launch, both recurr ing and 
total, has been reduced by over a million dollars. 
yield even more  reductions in the areas of Stage and Operations. 
believed by Lockheed that the SRM, however, will not yield further major 
reductions without a change in either performance o r  hardware safety fac- 
tors ,  which is not recommended by LFC. 
Therefore, the Baseline Revision 1 costs ($3,140.3B) are submitted as 
Lockheed's formal position on the SRM Booster Vehicle (WBS 3.3) .  
Further  analysis will 
It is 
The conclusions of the LPC study are:  
The LPC 156-inch-diameter baseline design meets all the 
technical requirements for the Booster Vehicle. 
The baseline design appears to  have the s t ructural  capability 
to withstand recovery-load impacts should recovery/reuse 
prove cost-effective for the Booster Vehicle. 
The SRM Booster Vehicle, because of its demonstrated 
technology, can be developed to meet a1.l NASA schedule 
requirements. 
The Baseline Revision 1 costs are realistic. and achievable 
and a r e  subject to further raduclion. 
The cost for development ($18Se1M) of a n  expendable SRM 
Booster Vehicle are less than 4,O percent of the total  Space 
Shuttle Development budget ($5,5B). 
The SaszPim Revision 9 SRM Booster Vehicle cost per 
launch (recurring $6,6M, total  $7,1M) is less expensive 
than that of a liquid booster ,  
In sumxYla.ry, Lockhead believes that an SRM propulsion system can perform 
the mission, can be easily developed in the t ime available, and will prove 
to be a cost-effective booater vehicle for the Space Shuttle Program. 
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GROUNDRULES AND APPROACH 
Tht study requirements specified by NASA a r e  summarized as  follows: 
NASA STUDY REQU 1 REMENTS - 
TECHNICAL 
ORBIKR PAYLOAD - 45AND 65 K POUNDS 
PARALLEL AND SERl ES BURNIlZO AND 156-1 NCH SRMIEXPENDABLE AND 
REUSABLEIW ITH AND WITHOUT TVClW ITH AND WITHOUT THRUST TERM1 NATI ON 
PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FROM PHASE B CONTRACTORS 
SCHEDULE 
DEVELOPMENT - 5 YEARS (1973 - 1978) 
PRODUCTION - 13 YEARS (1976 - 1988) 
LAUNCH TRAFFIC - 11 YEARS (1978 - 1988) 
LAUNCH SlTE - KSC ONLY 
MAXIMUM YEARLY LAUNCH RATES AND TOTAL PROGRAM QUANTITIES 
19 I106 
2OI201 
40 I357 
601445 
COST 
\ COST DATA - 1970 DOLLARS (NO ESCALATION) 
1 - 1  
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In addition to the NASA-specified study requirements, LPC imposed 
additional groundrules on itsel 'or the conduct of the study. 
LPC STUDY GROUNDRULES 
7
BASELINE DESIGN MUST: 
REFLECT TYPICAL PHASE B STUDY RESULTS 
11t.r nr..n..rrr..-rry\ 
VJL U U I I U I Y ~ I  R ~ I I L W  .EC#NOLOGY 
EMPHASIZE H l S H  RELIABILITY 
BASELINE COST MUST: 
USE SUPPORTABLE COST ESTIMATING 
REFLECT PAST MANUFACTURING EXPERIENCE 
c- J 
1-2  
5 2 9 - 6  
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Section 2 
CONCLUSIONS 
Technical 
(1) The 156-inch-diameter baseline design presented meets a l l  the 
technical requirements for the Booster Vehicle. 
The baseline design appears to have the s t ructural  capability to  
withstand recovery load impacts should recovery/reuse prove 
wst-effective for the Booster Vehicle. 
Abort can be accomplished successfully. 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) Ecological effzcts a r e  acceptable. 
Schedule 
The SRM Booster Vehicle, because of -A demons "rated technology, 
be developed to meet  all NASA schedule requirements. 
The Baseline Revision 1 costs a r e  realist ic and achievable and 
a r e  subject t o  further reduction 
The cost for development ($186.1M) of an expendabfe SRM 
Booster Vehicle is less than 4 percent of the total Space Shuttle 
Development budget ( $5.50B). 
The Baseline Revision 1 SRM Booster Vehicie cost per  launch 
(recurring $6.6M, Total $7.1M) is less  expensive than that of a 
liquid booster. 
2- 1 
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LPC RELATED EXPERIENCE 
1955 
i FIRST SEGMENTED MOTOR DWONSTRATION - SRh FIRST 120-INCH SRM 
INVENTED LOCKSEAI, (FLEXIBLE NOZZLE JOINT) 
FiRST 1%-INCH SRM 
EST-FIRED 4 ADDITIONAL 156-INCH SRMs 
THRUST LEVELS TO 3 MILLIONS POUNDS 
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO 700, OOO LBS 
NOZZLE TVC DEMONSTRATION 
DEVELOPED SRAM (MANRAED) 
I 
CONTINUING SRM BOOSTER STUDIES 
VANGUARD THIRD STAGE MOTOR, 
FlRST FLIGHT TEST 
MERCURY ESCAPE MOTOR, FIRST FLIGHT 
SRM CONCEPT, DESIGN, PRKESSING. 
TRANSPORTATION (NASA) 
APOLLO LAUNCH ESCAPE MOTOR, FIRST 
FLIGHT TEST 
2-2 
I P 3 . l u . r . .  . I ,.I -,. -," , 
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Section 3 
SUMMlb H Y 
3.1 DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE 
The baseline parallel, burn vehicle configuration is shown below. 
representative of the r,icst conservative configurations and vehicle weights 
received from the Phase B systems contractors. 
weight of 2.835 million pounds is compatible with the 65,000-pound payload. 
It i s  
The booster lift-off 
156-INCH VEHICLE BASELIW 
PARALLEL BURN - 
2EACH.156-IN. SRMS’ 
WEIGHTS LB x 
ORBITER LIFT-OfF WEIGHT 1.800 
BOOSTER LIFT-OFF WEIGHT 2835 
GROSS LIFT-OFF WEIGHT 4.635 
3-1 
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The illustration below shows the general configuration, performance, and 
weight information for the selected baseline mo%or, a 156-inch, parallel- 
burn, 7-segment SRM. The iner t  weights and mass  fraction a r e  conser- 
vative. They include the effects of thrust  termination and a thrust  vector 
control system designed to meet a most  severe se t  of requirements. The 
baseline thrust-time curve is shown in the middle of the cross-hatched 
area. This band represents the extremes of Phase B pr ime contractor 
inputs. Motor performance can be tailored to match any of the specific 
pr ime re qui r ement s. 
TYPICAL FOR 6 SEGMENTS 
PERFORMANCE SUMMARY 
INITIAL THRUST - 294 x lo6 
BURN TIME - 138 SEC 
MEOP - 1000 PSI  
LB 
5 P o l k  STAR 
AFT SEGMENT ONLY 
WEIGHT SUMMARY 
GROSS WEIGHT - 1.38 x 10; LB 
PROPELLANT - 1.23 x lo6 LB 
TOTAL INERTS - 0 . 1 5 ~  10 LB 
MASS RATIO- 0.89 
3 -2  
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BASELINE SRM COMPONENTS 
MOTOR CASE 
NOZZLE 
IGNITER 
INTERNAL 
INSULATION 
PROPELLANT 
THRUST 
TERMINATION 
THRUST VECTOR 
CONTROL 
D6AC, 225 KSI ULTIMATE 
ABLATIVE PLASTIC THROAT 
HEAD END PYROGEN 
FILLED NBR SHEET STOCK, 
AUTOCLAVE CURE 
PBAN, LPC-580, CLASS I I  
DUAL HEAD FND PORTS 
LOCKSEAL FLEXIBLE JOINT 
EXTENSIVE PRODUCTION 
EXPERIENCE - MINUTEMAN 
LOW RISK; MATERIALS PROVEN 
CONVENTIONAL SRM APPROACH 
PROVEN REL1 AB I LITY 
DEMONSTRATED ON'156-I NCH SRM'S 
POSE1 DON, MI NUTEMAN, AND 
TITAN I I I 
100 SUCCESSFUL FLIGHTS - 
USED ON POSEIDON 
The basis for selection of the components for the baseline SRM is demon- 
s t ra ted experience. 
development and the availability of cost  information based on actual experi-  
ence. Each of the components has  an extensive production history. 
propellant, polybutadiene acrylonitrile (PBAN), was used in previous 156- 
inch motors  f i red at Lockheed Propulsion Company. 
been classified by the ICC as  Class 11, fully safe to handle, ship, and s tore  
without danger of detonation. 
This approach provides for minimum-risk booster 
The 
This propellant has 
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The key stage features a r e  shown below. 
separation methods are incorporated in  the design. 
characterist ics are also straightforward, with emphasis on safety and high 
reliability. 
Conventional attachment and 
The electrical  
BASELINE STAGE FEATURES 
MECHANICAL THRUST TAKE-OUT FORWARD DISTRIBUTION OF LOADS 
REDUCED NOZZLE TORQUE 
RELIABLE, POSITIVE 
ON CENTERLINE 
FLARED AFT SKIRT 
SMALL SOLID MOTORS FOR 
SRM SEPARATION SEPARATION FORCE 
ELBTR I CAL NO RACEWAY; UMBILICAL SIMPLICITY,  COST 
TO ORBITER 
EBW HIGH VOLTAGE INITIATION 
REDUNDANT CIRCUITRY AND RELIABILITY 
SAFETY, RELIABILITY 
POWER 
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3.2 KEY ISSUES 
Lockheed Propulsion Company has  evaluated the key issues  related to the 
SRM booster: recovery/reuse,  abort, and ecological. considerations, The 
resul ts  of this evaluation are summarized below, with additional detail  on 
the following pages, 
RECOVERY FEASIBLE, REQU I RES DEVELOPMENT 
M I N I M U M  RECOVERY WEIGHT (175K) EASES DEVELOTMENT 
REUSE SAVES $858 Ml lL lON PROGRAM COSTS (10 REUSES) 
ABORT 
SAFE ABORT PRACTCCAL 
INDEPENDENT ESCAPE SYSTEM REQUl RED 
I 
ECOlOGY 
WASTE DISPOSAL iV0 PROBLEM 
NOISE NO PROBLEM 
hC1ll N LAUNCE PLUME - POSS I OLE MINOR PLANT EFFECTS 
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3.2.1 Recovery and Reuse of SRM Booster 
The following chart shows the effect of the number of reuses  on total pso- 
gram cost and cost per  launch. Two items a r e  particularly significant: 
(1) The total program cost and cost per  launch a r e  reduced by 
approximately 25 per cent with recoverability. 
(2) Most of the savings from recoverability a r e  achieved with 
only 10 reuses. 
Although much additional study and development remain to be accomplished, 
SRM recovery and reuse is feasible and cost effective, 
The effect of the program development/fa\-ilities cost on reuse savin s can 
be considered minimal. An increase from the baseline developmentyfacility 
estimate of $25 million to $100 million would reduce the potential savings 
per launch by less than 10 percent. 
OF RECOVERYIREUSE 
TOTAL PROGRAM COSTS & LAUNCH COSTS 
(ALL COSTS TO WBS 3.3) 
PROGRAM COST ($8) COSTILAUWH ($ MI 
a 4.0- EXPENDABLE --- - - 8.2 
3.66 --  EXPENDABLE - 8  
NUMBER OF NEW BOOSTER 
VEHICLES REQU I iw - 7  
I 
25- 
I I I I 
5 10 50 100 
2 0 l  
1 
NUMBER OF REUSES, 445 LAUNCHES 
(DEVELOPMENT COST %5Mi 
NOTE: MOST OF THE SAVINGS AVAILABLE BY RECOVERYIREUSE ARE ACHIEVED 
WITH 10 REUSES - ALL REPORTED COSTS FOR RECOVERY BASED ON 10 REUSES. 
LOWER COSTS ACHIEVABLEWITH REVISION I TO BASELINE COSTS 
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RECOVERY SEQUENCE 
x
DROGUE CllUTE 
CONTROLROCKET 
MAY BE REQUIRED 
ALTITUDE- MOK F T  
200qLB 
CHUTE SYSTEM DEPLOYED 
(WITHOUT RElPOl 
PROODSKETS FIRED (IF REQUlilEDl 
PACT BAGS DEPLOYED (I?Z@WtED) 
IMPACT 1MFTJSEC - 
- 
The baseline recovery sequence is shown above. The approach is based on - 
information generated by Phase  B prime contractor studies and information 
generated from this study. The pr imary  deceleration device is a s e r i e s  of 
staged parachutes deployed to limit the velocity to 100 feet per  second at 
impact. If a more  detailed s t ructural  evaluation indicates the necessity, 
additional devices (retrorockets and impact bags) may be used to reduce 
the impact velocity below the baseline. After impact, the SRM hardware is 
lifted aboard a barge and returned to shore for refurbishment and recycling. 
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3.2.2 Abort 
Abort conditions can be brought about by (1) orbi ter  engine failure, (2)  SRM 
malfunction, o r  (3)  crit ical  orbiter system malfunction. Regardless of the 
cause, the critical regime occur6 during early flight (0.5 to 40  seconds af ter  
launch) because the orbiter thrust-to-weight ratio is less than one, and the 
orbi ter  has not achieved a sufficient energy s ta te  to maneuver itself back to 
an emergency landing strip.  Xn order  to achieve safe abort during this 
regime, an independent orbi ter  emergency 8 s  cape system is required. 
This emergency escape system, sinlikr in concept to the Mercury and 
Apollo approaches, and capable of boosting the entire orbi ter  to safety, 
could be used when an abort  is required at any t ime during b o w t e r  operation. 
This abort  assessment  is summarized below. 
ABORT ASSESSMENT 
OBJECTIVE PERSONNEL SAFETY 
COND IT1 ONS ORBITER ENGI NE MALFUNCTION 
S RM MALFUNCTI ON 
ORBITER SYSTEM MALFUNCTION 
USE PROVEN TECHNIQUES 
CAPABILITY THROUGHOUT BOOST PHASE 
HOLD UOWN UNTIL THRUST VERIFIED 
GROUNO RULES ORB1 fER REUSE 
CONSTRAI N'r 
CRITICAL REGIME 
ORBlTERlHO TANK THRUST-TO-WEIGHT < 1 
NEAR PAD AND EARLY FLIGHT 
F C  
L 
I SAFE ABORT MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH AN INDEPENDENT ORBITER ESCAPE SYSTEM I cONcLuslON i ! 
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ABORT APPROACH 
---.---- 
SAFE ABORT MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH 
AN INDEPEIJOENT ORBITER ESCAPE SYSTEM \* ,/ 
A typical abort sequence is shown on the figure above, After verification 
of an abort requirement, the orbiter engine will be shut down and the orbiter 
separated from the vehicle. The orbiter escape rocket sys tem will1 then be 
activated to propel. the orbiter to a sufficient altitude and velocity to allow a 
safe glide back to aii emergency landing strip. For abort, the boosters will 
be thrust  -terminated to render the booster/tank assembly nonpropulsivc for 
a controlled descect to the ocean. 
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PROPELLANT 
3.2.3 Environmental Impact 
No PROBLEM 
lNClNERATlOWSCRU66lNG 
0
During the course of the study, L P C  evaluated the potential sources of 
environmental. impact: manufacturing waste disposal, noise, and plume 
exhaust prodacts. No problems o r  operational limitations caused by the 
SRM booster have Seer identified. The effect of plume exhaust products 
on the environment is the m-mt complex of the potential sources,  and is 
discussed in more  detail. 
STATIC FIRING 
NOiSE a LAUNCH NO PROBLEM REMOTE TEST FACILITY SAME AS SATURN V FACILI?'.' 
ATMOS PHERl C DISPERSION 
- 
EXHAOST 
PRODUCTS LACNCH 
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ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT- PLUME CLOUD 
The results of LPC's findings on rocket exhaust products a r e  summarized 
above. Shortly after launch, and until 40 seconds afterwards, the plume 
cloud is in contact with the launch pad. The concentration of hydrochloric 
acid (NC1) in the plume during this period is high (>3,000 ppm). After 40 
seconds (based on Titan LZI data), the plume rises above the pad as a resul t  
of convective forces of the hot exhaust gases, and the HC1 concentration at 
the launch pad drops below 3 ppm. 
perses  into the atmosphere. 
during extreme humidity conditions, such as a rain storm. 
the wind is off-shore, there  is no problem since the dilute HC1 is dissipated 
over the ocean. 
taneously will dilute HC1 fall  in the launch area.  There will be no personnel 
problem, but minor cosmetic damage to plant life in  the immediate area 
may occur. 
The cloud then r i s e s  rapidly and dis-  
The concentration of HC1 is of concern only 
Even then, i f  
Only if r a i n  and on-shore wind conditions prevail  s imul-  
3 - 1 1  
629 -6 
Vol  I 
3.3 BASELINE PROGRAM AND SCHEDULE 
The proposed baseline program and an assumed typical schedule are pre-  
sented below. The total program includes 908 SRMs. 
f 
SRM BOOSTER SUMMARY 
BASELINE PROGRAM 
DEVELOPMENT - LPC POTRERO FACILITY 
DEVELOPMENT TESTS - POTRERO 
FiRT MOTOR E S T S  - POTRERO 
TWO INERT SRM STAGES - KSC 
ONE UNMANNED FLIGHT - KSC 
FIRST FIVE MAN.SD LAUNCHES - KSC 
TOTAL DEVELOPMENT 
- SRM'S 
5 
4 
4 
2 
10 
25 
- 
PRODUCTlON 
PRODCCTION FLIGHTS (440) POTRERO OR NEW FACILITY 880 
FACILITY START-UP TESTS -POTRERO 3 
TOTAL PRODUCTION 883 
TOTAL S RM'S 908 
156-INCH SASELIM PROGRAM SCHEDULE 
BOOSTER 
CONTRACI AWARD 
ESIW mLEVIEIs 
ooro.opMEwT ASIS 61 
PFRT ESiS (61 
DWMY MOTOR FAB t. DELIVERY ta 
3-12  
LOGKHEEO PROPULSION COMPANV 
629 -6 
Vol I 
3.4 COSTS 
The LPC groundrules to use proven technology has resulted in motor designs 
and costs  that are conservative. 
able cost items. The table below summarizes LPC's approach to the costing 
effort . 
The costs  include all the known, identifi- 
T 
SUMMARY - COST 
@ SRM BASELINECOSTS ARE CONSERVATIVE 
e CONSERVATIVE IN DESIGN APPROACH 
- 1.4 SAFETY FACTOR - PRESSURE VESSEL 
- 2.0 SAFETY FACTOR - INSULATION 
USE OF ACTUAL COS; HISSCRY 
UPDATED SUPPLIER INFORMATION 
COSTS BASED ON DEMONSTRATED TECiNOLOGY 
COSTS 1 NCLUDE 
- THRUST VECTOR CONTROL 
- THRUST TERM1NATi.Y 
- EXPENDABLE BOOSTER 
i 
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The following figure presents a summary  of total program costs for the base- 
line, expendable-booster system. 
system and the thrust  termination system a r e  included. 
The costs of the thrust  vector control 
The original baseline total program cost was 3.66 billion dollars and the cost 
per  launch was 8.2 million dollars. 
program cost is 3.14 billion dollars and the cost  per  launch is 7.1 million 
dollars. 
in the KSC operation effort, and may  be further reduced by as much as 30 
percent in this area with additional study and detailed task definition. The 
total program cost includes all development and production costs. The total  
cost divided by the total  number of launches (445) equals the cost pe r  launch. 
The current  baseline (Revision I) total  
The Revision I baseline cost is still considered to be conservative 
SUMMARY 
TOTAL BOOSTER VEHICLE PROGRAM COSTS 
(WBS" LEVEL 3.3) - 445 LAUNCHES 
3 4 5 6 7  
COST PER LAUNCH ($ MI 
\ 'WBS = WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE 
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As directed by NASA, LPC alscj attempted to determine "hard" versus  
l lsoftl l  costs, and an upper band was estimated above the baseline for a 
"worst condition". Doe to LPC's  solid rocket motor experience, the p ro -  
pulsion system costs a r e  "hard" and, therefore,  an upper limit of 2 percent 
on the SRM cost has  been identified. 
''soft" and a 30-percent upper limit on the Stage cost was established. With  
the SRM and Stage combined, a total  of 10-percent upward variation has 
been identified in the Booster Vehicle (WBS 3.3)  Program costs. A lower 
range has a lso been established, which identifies potential reductions for 
thrust  vector control, thrust  termination, and recovery. 
LPC believes that the Stage costs a r e  
SUMMARY 
TOTAL BOOSTER VEHICLE PROGRAM COSTS 
INDIVIDUAL EFFECT 
F 
(WBS LEVEL 3.3) - 445 LAUNCHES 
3.66 
3.14 
3 
2 
1 I I I 
3 4 5 6 7 8  
t + 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
 
9 
SRM TAGE ]lO%BASE 
ll - 3.QOB18.1M 
WC'  - 3.318 I 7.4M 
RECOVERY - 2.808 I 6.3M 
COST PER LAUNCH (B MI 
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The next graph shows the effect of a reduced number of launches on total 
program cost and the total booster vehicle cost per  launch. 
baseline and the current  Revision I baseline costs a r e  presented. 
limit and recovery bands a r e  referenced to the initial baseline costs. 
Both the initial 
The upper 
SUMMARY 
PARAMETRIC COST ANALYSIS -TOTAL BOOSTER VEHICLE 
(WBS 3.3) 
4 I I I I I 
0 100 200 m 400 j00 
TOTAL NUMBER OF LAUNCHES 
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Key baseline costs a r e  summarized on the chart  below. Both baseline costs 
and baseline Revision I costs have been generated, with the Revision I nun- 
bers  resulting from later review of all es t imates ,  to obtain a refinement not 
feasible in the limited t ime available before re lease  of the initial baseline 
numbers, 
Vehicle (Work Breakdown Structure Item 3 .3 )  is 3.14 billion dollars,  These 
values m s u l t  in a total pr3gram cost per  launch of 7.1 million dollars, o r  a 
recurr ing cost per SRM of 2.25 million dollars. 
The current Revision I baseline total  program for the Booster ' 
TOTAL BOOSTER VEHICLE COST 
$M REV. I BASELINE 
DEVELOPMENT 1385 48 186 4 
- SRM STAGE OPS 
PRODUCTION 2,0375 9175 2,9544 
TOTAL BOOSTER PROG. COST 2,175 ,965 3,140 
1 WBS 3.0 
I TOTAL COST LAUNCH 7.1 
RECURRING SRM COST 2,251MTR 
4.491VEH 
BASELINE 
STAGE TOTAL 
DEVELOPMENT 141.6 48.2 189.8 
PRODUCTION 2,545.7 
TOTAL BOOSTER VEHICLE PROGRAM COST 2,687.3 977.2 3,664.5 
TOTAL VEHICLE COSTlLAUNCH 8.2 
AVERAGE-RECURRING SRM COST 2.9lMOTOR (5.81VEHICLE) 
7 - p  
\COSTS LOWER THAN PREVIOUSLY REPORTED 
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i AVERAGE MOTOR COMPONENT COST - MAJOR COMPONENTS - 
INITIAL REV. I 
BASELINE BASELINE 
Z M  $M MATERIAL COST PER SRM 
CASE 0,717 $0.657 
INTERNAL INSULATION 
NOZZLE 
LO& KSEAL 
IGNITER 
THRUST TERMINATION 
PROPELLANT (RAW MATERIAL ONLY) 
\POWER 
0.100 0. loo 
0.303 0.273 
0.070 0.070 
0.025 0.023 
0.034 0.034 
0.324 0.324 
0.189 a. 168 
TOTAL %%I MATERIAL COSTlMOTOR - $1.762M I $1.551M 
I MATERIAL COST - TOTAL PROGRAM 
MATERIALS DOLLARSlMOTOR X 908 MOTORS S.l.6OS 81.36B 
TOTAL PROGRAM SRM COST CHECK 
$2.278 TOTAL MATERIAL DOLLARS + &I% = - $ 2 6 7 8  I 
In order  to evaluate the validity of the baseline costs, s eve ra l  analyses were 
conducted. 
mater ia l s  in an SRiM. 
million dollars,  o r  a total program cost for  motor mater ia l  of 1.6 billion 
dollars. Since experience f rom prior  programs indicates that  material 
should account for at  least  60 percent of the total program for  the contem- 
plated make o r  buy ratio, a conservative est imate  for the initial baseline 
SRM total  cost was 2.67 billion dollara. This number compared well with 
the 2.69 billion dollars in LPC's  baseline costs and verified the conserva- 
tism of the LPC costs. 
This char t  summarizes  the cost of major  components and raw 
The initial baseline ma te r i a l  cost per  SRM was 1.762 
Fur ther  refinement of mater ia l  costs achieved by working with LPC's  
mater ia l  suppliers has resulted in a Revision I, baseline ma te r i a l  cost 
per  SRM of 1.551 million dollars. Using the same  rationale as above, 
this number resul ts  in a projected total  program SRM cost of 2.27 billion 
dollars,  which again compares well with the 2.18 billion dollar total SRM 
cost contained in the Revision I baseline costs. 
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A further analysis of LPC's baseline cost is summarized cn the figure below, 
The costs of various SRMs a r e  plotted versus  the total  impulse (total energy) 
in the motor. 
actual cost history from major  solid rocket motor development and productioq 
programs. 
first production buy, and the squares  subsequent production buys. The 
development phase of each of these programs consisted of more  than 50 rocket 
motors,  with fur ther  production learning indicated by the decreasing cost for  
each production buy. 
The various data points on the left half of the chart  represent  
The triangles represent  the development phase, the ci rcles  the 
The triangles in the center of the chart  represent  the actual cost of the large 
solid motor programs conducted by LPC. 
120-1 and 156- 1 through 156-5, were single-motor programs with each motor 
a different configuration. The costs shown include all nonrecurring expenses 
such a s  design, tooling, and test;. 
These programs,  designated by 
The baseline SRM development and production costs a r e  shown at  the extreine 
right side of the chart. The development cost appears to be reasonable, but 
conservative, considering that the baseline program has 25 development 
motors as comsared to the one-of-a-kind large solid motor development costs 
previously discussed, The initial baseline production cost a l so  appears  to be 
realistic, and conservative based on experience. 
on the left half of the chart)  a lso indicates that production motors may well 
fa.11 into the lower half of the cost bands. The Revision I baseline cost of 2.25 
iaillion dollars per  SRM reflects production experience on previous programs. 
Earlier experience (shown 
7
SOLID-ROCKET MOTOR 
COST VERSUS TOTAL IMPULSE 
/ #= I 
1 OFOLLOW-ON PRODUCTION 
I 
1 ,  I 
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COST €FFECT OF BOOSTER VEHICLE WEIGHT 
TOTAL PROGRAM ( WBS LEVEL 3.3) - 445 LAUNCHES 
' COSTILAUNCH 7 CUMULATIVE EFFECT TOTAL PROGRAM 
3.14 
3.0 - 
6.0 
2.24 - 
2.0 =- 
I. 92 
1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 
. BOOSTER LIFTOFF WEIGHT (LB X 10-6) 
An analysis was also conducted to determine the variation of program costs 
as a function of booster lift-off weight. 
s idered ref lects  the variation noted i n  the inputs received by LPC from the 
individual Phase B system contractors. Thz figure abovz ahows the effect 
on total program costs and cost per  launch. It can be noted from the graph 
that LPC's baseline design is a t  the conservative end, and that; the range of 
contractor inputs for booster lift-off weight can affect the coe'is. by as  much 
as 20 percent. This fact is significant when cornparins costa, aubmitted by 
different pr ime and SRM contractors.  
within this ent i re  range, and therefore costs must  be normalized before a n  
accurate  comparison can be made. 
bringing the, total program cast  down to 3 . 0  billion dollars a.nd the to t a l  cost 
per launch to  6.7 m i l l i m  dollars. 
a l so  shown for reference. 
The range o? lift-off weights con- 
Thil- study permitted selections 
This amount of variation can resul t  in 
The Revision I baseiine cost per  launch is 
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The figure below shows the same effect on the total  recurr ing cost and the 
total recurr ing cost per  launch. In  this case,  the total recurr ing cost: and 
cost per  launch can also vary as much as 20 percent,  down to 2.75 billior, 
dollars total cost and to 6.75 million dollars per  launch, 
baseline cost per  launch is also shown for reference. 
The Revision I 
These numbers a r e  fo r  fully expendable 8RMs. If recovery and reuse  a r e  
censidered, the recurr ing cost per  launch will approach 5 million dollars. 
\ 
COST EFFECT OF BOOSTER VEHICLE WEIGHT 
RECURRING (WBS LEVEL3.3) -440 LAUNCHES 
TOTAL RECURRING COSTILAUNCH 
CUMULATIVE EFFECT 
(8 6) 
4.0 
3.45 
3.0 
2.9 
9.0 
a. o 
7.8 
7.0 
6.6 
6.0 
5.0 
4.6 2.0 
1 . 9 ” y L 2 . 0  2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 
BOOSTER LIFTOFF WEIGHT (LB X W6) 
BASELINE- 
REV 1 
3 - 2 1  
LCICKHEED PROPULPION COMPANY 
629 -6 
'701 I 
The following chart presents a graphic comparison of the original baseline 
costs versus the potential costs that LRC believes to be attainable. The 
comparison shows a potential 32-percent reduction in vehicle cost (from 
7.8 to 5.3 million dollars). The Revision I baseline costs a l ready show that 
an expendable vehicle cost per  launch of 6.6 million dollars can be achieved. 
The use of a recoverable sys tem could potentially reduce the recuyrbng cost 
per launch to as low as 5.3 million dollars. 
%CURRING LAUNCH COST5 SASELlME YS POTEMTIAL 
3@=--- $M 
BOOSTER VM I CLE 
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\ 
ANNUAL FUNDING 
(BOOSTER VEH KLE) 
DEVELOPMENT REQUI REMENTS 
1.500 I I I I 
Annual fmding requirenients of the SRM Booster Vehicle are  shown in the 
figure above to be a small fractioc of the anticipated NASA Space Shuttle 
budget for development. 
year. 
ment budget. 
The peak annual fwding is 5 0  million dollars per 
Total DDT&E costs are 3.4 percent of the 5 .5  b i l l i w  dollar develop- 
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/- 
I 
-%=---- 
TOTAL BOOSTER VEHICLE COST COMPARISOU 
-1 
156-IN. PARALLEL SRM 
RECOVERABLE (10 REUSES) 
BASE11 NE-REV1 S ION 1 
100 ?w Mo 40l %I 600 57.1M 
TOTAL NUMBER OF FLIGHTS 
EXPENDABLE SOLID VS RECOVERABLE SOLID VS 
RECOVERABLE LIQUID E V E R A K E  LIQUID 
445 a1 445 201 HUMBER OF LAUNCHES - -  
COST PER LAUNCH - LIQUID NMM) 9. 2 13.1 9.2 13.1 
COST PER LAUNCH - SOLIO($M) a2 9.2 6.3 6.8 
SAVINGS PER LAUNCHIM) 1.0 3.9 2 9  6.3 
- -  
TOTAL PROGRAM SAVINGS Oh3 445 784 1.291 1.264 
The figure above compares costs of the SRM booster with those of 7 pressure- 
fed liquid bo os t er . 
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3.6 SUPPORTING RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 
As the resul t  of this study program, LPC has identified eight a r eas  of 
supporting research  and technology which it recommends for future study. 
These a reas  a r e  summarized below. 
RECOMMENDED SUPPORTING RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
DESIGN AND DEMONSTRATION OF SRM RECOVERY AND REUSE 
SHUllLE SRM THRUST TERMINATION SYSTEM DESIGN AND COMPONENT TESTS 
THRUST VECTOR CONTROL SYSTEM DEFINITION STUDY 
CANTED, MOVABLE NOZZLE OPTIMIZATION 
STUDY OF OPTIMUM SOLID ROCKET MOTOR DESIGN FOR GROWTH POTENTIAL 
COST EFFECTIVENESS STUDY OF LOW COST SRM TECHNOLOGY 
COMPARISON OF THE USAF TITAN I I I CID AND THE NASA SPACE SHUTTLE 
ENV I RONMENTAL EFFECTS 
STUDY OF OPTIMUM STEEL SELECTION FOR A REUSABLE SRM MOTOR CASE 
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3.7 LIAISON WITH PHASE B SYSTEMS CONTRACTORS 
In order  to secure performance requirzments from, and to provide timely 
study data to, Phase B systems contractors,  Lockheed Propulsion Company 
provided a f u i i - t h e  liaison staff. The L P C  baseline SRM design resulted 
f rom review of the design requirements received from each of the Phase  B 
contractors . 
3.8 PRESENTATIONS AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION 
In conformance with the study requirements,  Lockheed Propulsion Company 
presented formal  program reviews at the George C. Marshal l  Space Flight 
Center, Huntsville, Alabama, on 14 Februa ry  1972 and at NASA Headquarters, 
Washington, D, C., on 23 Februa ry  1972. 
A tabulation of supporting documentation prepared during the study program 
is presented in Section 9 of Book 1, Volurne 11, of this report ,  
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